There is a growing consensus in the media that the best course in Iraq lies somewhere in between the expeditious and complete withdrawal advocated by the democrats and the continuation of the surge strategy currently being implemented by the Bush administration. This strategy was most eloquently articulated in the full page editorial of the Sunday Times two weeks ago and a concurrent article in Time magazine. Its salient features are: a reduction of US troop numbers from the current 160,000 to 40,000-60,000, refocusing their mission on hunting Al-Queda and training the Iraqi army and a diplomatic offensive to engage Iraqs neighbours in the reconciliation and reconstruction process. US troops would no longer referee the nascent civil war, or remain in small bases in urban centers to offer close protection to ordinary Iraqis, the central feature of the surge strategy.
This strategy has some superficially seductive components but if implemented would almost inevitably lead to disastrous consequences that both the continuation of the surge or full withdrawal would avoid or at least mitigate. It is certainly true that a withdrawal to large bases would ensure that US combat deaths would fall as fewer of them would be engaged in actual fighting. A single minded focus on hunting Al-Queda could expand on the favourable results already achieved by the surge thus far. Finally, it is not beyond the realm of possibility that a sincere and substantive overture to Iran and Syria might be embraced by them, though even the most optimistic advocates of a diplomatic approach concede that outcome to be unlikely.
These advantages pale in importance when the other likely results of the “middle ground” strategy are taken into account. The most positive result of the surge thus far has been a moderate though significant reduction in Iraqi civilian deaths. This has been due to the presence of US troops in small bases in urban areas, restraining sectarian death squads and protecting commercial and reconstruction activities: in other words, refereeing a civil war. By withdrawing them from those bases to either return home or train the Iraqi army, the civilian death toll would undoubtedly skyrocket as the Shiite death squads and Sunni suicide bombers currently held at least partially in check by US forces ran amok. It is hard to see how the fitfull and uneven political progress that has been made by the Iraqi government would be accelerated by such an outcome. More likely it would regress into the sectarianism that is its habit, as American influence declined in tandem with its military strength. It is also likely that the progress recently made in Anbar province (and which a Times Journalist referred to as spectacular on the same day as the aforementioned editiorial) would be reversed as the tribal sheiks who have supported us are caught between the anvil of the Shiite dominated Iraqi army and the hammer of Al-Queda extremist who they are already battling.
In fact what the “middle ground” strategy with its emphasis on hunting Al-Queda and training the Iraqi army most closely resembles, is the previous US effort under General Casey before General Petreaus took over. It was universally labelled as a failure and there is no reason to believe it would work any better the second time round. If we are to stay, the strategy we have now seems to offer the best chance of success.
A partial withdrawal would also be worse than a full one. A full withdrawal would allow us to redirect our attention and resources to other priorities, both to win the war on terror, and accomplish the full, wide spectrum of our foreign policy goals. The partial withdrawal would still leave large numbers of American troops in Iraq and unavailable for other duties. In addition, as long as so many as one remained the attention of the American people and policy makers would remain tightly focused on Iraq and its problems to the detriment of the other challenges we face. Finally and most importantly, as long as American troops remain in Iraq in significant numbers, we will retain responsibility, in the eyes of the world and Iraqis themselves for whatever negative outcomes occur. To reduce our ability to influence events while leaving ourselves morally and politically liable for them would be a grave error indeed.
We have a choice, either stay in Iraq and hope that our presence will eventually enable a brighter future to emerge, or to abandon our attempt to repaint its dark canvas, cut our losses and leave. To continue our involvement in the war, but do so half heartedly would be the worst possible decision, and would likely lead to the worst possible outcome.